A recent Law.com story by Jimmy Hoover, “Justices to Examine Meaning of ‘Prevailing Party’ in Attorney Fee Disputes”, reports that, to those who follow legal news, it’s not uncommon to see parties declaring victory after a court decision that seems to go against them.  Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton was criticized last week for doing just that on social media last week after the U.S. Supreme Court allowed takings litigation to proceed against the state over property flooding caused by a highway barrier.

Usually, the stakes of such episodes involve little more than attorneys’ egos and their win-loss records.  But an appeal taken up by the Supreme Court shows that deciding after litigation has concluded which side is the “prevailing party” can affect more than just bragging rights but real dollars and cents in the form of attorney fees.

The high court granted certiorari, or review, in Lackey v. Stinnie, an appeal by the Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles, which is now on the hook for potentially more than $1 million in legal fees from plaintiffs who had secured a preliminary injunction against the DMV in a civil rights lawsuit.  The agency’s petition raises two questions for the justices, which will hear the dispute next term.

The first is whether a party “must obtain a ruling that conclusively decides the merits in its favor,” rather than just a preliminary injunction, to obtain attorney fees in a civil rights suit under Section 1988 of the 1976 Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Award Act.  The second is whether the parties’ legal relationship must change through a “judicial act” or whether a nonjudicial event mooting the case is enough to obtain fees under the statute.

The case, the DMV has said, could affect who’s eligible for attorney fees in a number of other areas, as well, such as trademark infringement, voting rights and disability discrimination, where fee-shifting laws use the phrase “prevailing party.”  In their putative class action against the DMV, a number of plaintiffs with past criminal convictions accused the agency of violating their rights by automatically suspending their licenses over court fees they could not afford to pay.

The plaintiffs won a preliminary injunction from the district court blocking state officials from enforcing the Virginia law against them, as the judge concluding they were likely to succeed on the merits of their procedural due process claim.  As the case proceeded to trial, the litigation was delayed and ultimately rendered moot by the Virginia General Assembly, which suspended and later repealed the law in question after public pushback.

The plaintiffs’ original request for attorney fees was rejected, but on appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit agreed to rehear the case en banc.  The court’s 7-4 ruling held that, “When a preliminary injunction provides the plaintiff concrete, irreversible relief on the merits of her claim and becomes moot before final judgment because no further court-ordered assistance proves necessary, the subsequent mootness of the case does not preclude an award of attorney’s fees.”

In its certiorari petition to the Supreme Court in November, the DMV said the standard for obtaining attorneys’ fees under Section 1988 “presents multiple circuit splits” and the case is one of importance that the Supreme Court should resolve.  “[A]ttorney’s fees in civil rights cases often impose substantial financial burdens on state governments,” the DMV wrote in its petition filed by lawyers from the Virginia attorney general’s office and Hunton Andrews Kurth LLP.

“Plaintiffs have already requested an award of more than $767,000 in appellate fees alone,” the petition stated.  “Their total fee request likely will run into the millions of dollars, considering the years of litigation in the district court.”  Further, the state agency wrote, “the risk of large, unpredictable fee awards will deter States from voluntarily altering allegedly unlawful behavior.”

The term “prevailing party” is also peppered throughout many fee-shifting statutes, so the issue is one that could affect attorneys’ fees in the areas of trademark law, disability discrimination and voting rights, the state added.  “[T]he effect of the term’s interpretation is sweeping,” the petition stated.

The plaintiffs had asked the court to pass on the case, denying there was any split “requiring this Court’s resolution.”  They wrote that the earlier injunction in the case was “on the merits” and “materially altered the legal relationship between the parties.”  “Respondents are prevailing parties and would be in every circuit,” stated the brief in opposition, filed by lawyers at McGuire Woods.  Oral arguments have not yet been scheduled in the case. The court is expected to render its decision by the end of June 2025.

A recent Law 360 story by Lauraann Wood, “Ill. Justices Weigh Whether Rule Violation Merits Fee Award”, reports that the Illinois Supreme Court has questioned whether two law firms should be allowed to preserve their $1.7 million fee award for their work on a family dispute that settled after they were fired, as the justices asked whether fees are appropriate if the firms never disclosed how they would split the money.

Every justice on the state high court bench offered either a question or a criticism during oral argument as they weighed whether the quantum meruit claim by Stephen J. Schlegel Ltd. and Andrew W. Levenfeld & Associates Ltd. was correctly sent back to the trial court for an award that ignores their illegal fee agreement with former clients Maureen V. O'Brien and her nephew Daniel O'Brien III.

Some justices highlighted on one hand the 3,000 hours and years of work the firms put into the O'Briens' underlying family dispute before they were fired and the case settled about two weeks later.  Other justices, including Justice Joy Cunningham, noted the firms' failure to properly disclose their fee-sharing agreement to the O'Briens and questioned whether allowing them to recover fees essentially rewards them for violating a rule of professional conduct.

"Rules exist for a reason," Justice Cunningham said.  "It seems to me from looking at the figure that … they basically got what they would have gotten anyway, so the rule means nothing, and as a Supreme Court, are we supposed to agree that it's OK not to follow our rules?"

Representing the firms, Jeremy Boeder of Tribler Orpett & Meyer PC argued that his clients should receive an equitable fee award for their work because the trial court considered their rule violation and its potential effects before awarding their fees.  Pressed by Justice Cunningham to identify the consequence they would then face for violating the state's fee-sharing disclosure rule, Boeder said there would be none.  "And it's our position that there shouldn't always be a consequence in a case like this for a violation of a rule of professional conduct," he argued.

Acknowledging Justice Lisa Holder White's suggestion that the trial court could award the firms the same amount in fees even without considering their client contract, Boeder argued that spending the time "to get to the point that we've already reached" is unnecessary.  That process would also be wrong because sending the case back would essentially tell the trial court that it "has to go with the second-best option" despite considering all the relevant evidence in a six-day bench trial, he told the justices.  "Why should that be a command upon a trial court of equity, who really was in the best position to evaluate all of the issues here?" the attorney said.

The O'Briens' counsel argued that the firms should not receive any fees even if the justices agree they should go back to the trial court for a new award. Indeed, the O'Briens believe the firms' work is worth "less than zero," partly because they advised Maureen O'Brien to resign as the coexecutor of her parents' estate, which was her "only source of leverage, or power, or control" in the underlying dispute, John Fitzgerald of Tabet DiVito & Rothstein LLC told the justices.  "It is impossible to overstate how catastrophic that legal advice was," he told the court.

The state high court has previously voided a fee agreement that violated professional conduct rules in a case between a litigation consultant and an expert search firm, and the reasoning then should still apply because "there's no public policy reason or any other reason to treat lawyers differently from anyone else who enters a contract that violates public policy," Fitzgerald argued.  "Quantum meruit means 'as much as he or she deserves. 'No one deserves anything that violates public policy," he said.

Fees are also inappropriate because although the firms litigated some issues in the O'Briens' underlying dispute and made some settlement offers, there is no proof the O'Briens' subsequent counsel relied on the firms' earlier work to eventually reach their $16.85 million settlement, Fitzgerald argued.  Any outstanding settlement offers had been withdrawn, and no new offers had been made for weeks by the time the firms were fired, so any potential numbers had gone back to zero by the time the O'Briens' subsequent counsel began handling their case, he said.  "The fact that the next lawyer was able to settle the case on certain terms, I don't think that necessarily means these plaintiffs could have gotten that deal done on the same terms or comparable terms," Fitzgerald said.

Blasting that contention on rebuttal, Boeder argued that it was the firms' settlement back-and-forth that ultimately brought the underlying litigants to their agreeable meeting points and resolve their family dispute.  The firms had made an $18.3 million demand that was met with a $16.25 offer, which then prompted a $16.75 million counter-demand the firms were prepared to send back before they were ultimately fired, he said.  "The settlement was on almost exactly the same terms as the counter-demand that my client proposed," Boeder argued.  "Why wasn't that counter-demand made?  Because Dan and Maureen O'Brien refused to allow my clients to make it on their behalf."

A recent Law 360 story by Jeff Montgomery, “Epic Tesla Fee Bid May Blaze Extraordinary Chancery Path”, reports that an unprecedented $5 billion-plus stock-based fee award sought by class attorneys who recently short-circuited Tesla CEO Elon Musk's 12-step, $51 billion compensation package has set up an equally unprecedented test for Delaware Court of Chancery fee guidelines and a potential award one law expert described as "dynastic wealth."

Class attorneys who have battled Tesla's compensation scheme for Musk since mid-2018 last week sought more than 11% of the 266,947,208 Tesla shares freed up Jan. 30, when Chancellor Kathaleen St. J. McCormick ordered rescission of the options that Tesla's board awarded to Musk in an all-stock compensation plan.  The value had been estimated initially at $5.6 billion, but would fluctuate with the value of Tesla's stock.

While the process of seeking a stock fee award instead of cash is not unprecedented, it is an unusual posture for Delaware Chancery litigation, and its scale is likely to reopen what were once considered settled questions over counsel risks, rewards, and just how much attorneys can command for corporate benefit fees, experts told Law360.

"Given the order of magnitude here, I suspect that the case will not set any records in terms of percentage of the recovery awarded to the plaintiffs attorneys, but in absolute terms it'll still amount to dynastic wealth," said University of Connecticut School of Law professor Minor Myers. He described the fee as "destined to be epic, if only because it involves the invalidation of a pay package that was itself comically large."

Chancellor McCormick put the fee in play with an order rescinding Musk's 12-tranche, all-stock compensation plan Jan. 30, after a week-long trial in November 2022.  The ruling cited disclosure failures, murky terms, conflicted director architects and Musk's own conflicted influence in Tesla's creation of an Everest-sized mount of fast-triggering stock options.

"Plaintiff won complete recission of the largest pay package ever issued," the fee motion, filed last week, said.  "Our research demonstrates that the court's decree of recission, conservatively valued, was the largest compensatory award in the history of American jurisprudence by multiples," driven by "the gargantuan size of the tort underlying this action."

But class attorneys are seeking an equally gargantuan fee, even after departing from calculation customs that Vice Chancellor J. Travis Laster stressed last year in declining to apply a size reduction to a nearly 27%, $267 million award to stockholders who challenged a Dell Technolgies stock swap in 2018.  In his fee ruling, the vice chancellor said the calls to reduce the Dell fee conflicted with court efforts to reward attorneys for going deeper into litigation and taking greater risks in pursuit of legitimate claims.

"Of course, everyone involved will try to fit this into an existing framework, but the reality is that a $5.6 billion fee award is staggeringly high, whatever factors are considered," said Lyman P.Q. Johnson, Robert O. Bentley professor of law, emeritus, at Washington and Lee School of Law.  "I think Chancellor McCormick will find a way to go a fair bit lower, while still providing the attorneys with a very high award of some amount."  Johnson added: "The shock of Musk's compensation, undone by the chancellor, is unlikely to be followed by what many would regard as a shockingly high $5.6 billion fee award."

Vice Chancellor Laster's most recent big fee ruling established, pending appeal, a $266.7 million fee last year for attorneys who secured a $1 billion settlement for minority stockholders who sued over a $23.9 million Dell Technologies stock swap in 2018.

In Dell, the vice chancellor rejected investor arguments that large "mega-fund" settlements justified throttling back on fee payouts because customary fee percentages can produce massive, windfall payouts.  Instead, Vice Chancellor Laster defended the use of customary, variable percentages, including 15% to 25% shares of awards for settlements after "meaningful litigation and motion practice" and up to 33% post-trial.  He also acknowledged the tension between successful plaintiffs' counsel seeking appropriate compensation and large investors working to minimize carve-outs from court awards.

In Tesla, class attorneys, wary of blowback over big recoveries borne of typical fee ratios, acknowledged the Dell ruling's guidance, but also pointed to an earlier ruling that produced the current largest court-approved fee, a $304 million award approved in 2011 by then-Chancellor Leo E. Strine and upheld by Delaware's Supreme Court a year later.

That decision required Grupo Mexico to return to Southern Peru Copper Corp. nearly $1.3 billion worth of Southern Peru stock — rather than cash — after finding that Southern Copper had been coerced by a conflicted, controlling stockholder into overpaying for a Grupo Mexico mine in 2005.  With pre- and post-judgment interest, the award reached more than $2 billion, with class attorneys awarded 15%, or $304 million, for fees and expenses.

Tesla class attorneys referenced the 15% fee carve-out approved in Southern Peru, but adjusted even that percentage downward — to just over 11% — to reflect value added by the absence of a holding period for any award of Tesla shares before they could be sold.  Case costs included more than $13.6 million in attorney fees and more than $1.1 million in expenses during the multi-year Chancery action.  Requested fees would equal a $288,888 hourly rate that the fee motion said was justified by the case's complexity, results and attorney skill levels, among other factors.

Jill E. Fisch, Saul A. Fox distinguished professor of business law at the University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School, said use of stock for attorney fees was once "kind of frowned upon," but is not unprecedented.  "They are repeat players" in Delaware's courts, Fisch said of the attorney teams that prevailed in the Tesla case.  "They want credibility before the court.  The numbers, I think, reflect the benefit and risk of this kind of litigation, and traditionally, Chancery Court has acknowledged those risks."

The suit, led by stockholder Richard Tornetta, branded Musk's compensation package as unprecedented and unfair, noting that Musk had already qualified for some $20 billion in awards by the time the suit was filed, "making him one of the richest men on Earth" at the time.  It alleged in part that he relied on two in-house Tesla attorneys for work on the plan before the board's conflicted compensation committee took up the issue.

Ann M. Lipton, the Michael M. Fleishman associate professor in business law and entrepreneurship at Tulane University Law School and associate dean, pointed to another Tesla- and Musk-related case to illustrate the risks stockholder attorneys take.

Last year, after about seven years of litigation, Delaware's Supreme Court upheld a post-trial dismissal of a suit filed by stockholders of rooftop solar venture SolarCity, seeking damages tied to Tesla's $2.6 billion purchase of the company, for which Musk was CEO and also held a big share of company stock.

At one point during the case, the SolarCity stockholders suggested a damage award amounting to a $13 billion giveback of Tesla stock Musk received for his SolarCity shares. Dismissal of the case and rejection of class claims, however, wiped out class attorneys' hopes for a share of a big award.

In the more-recent scuttling of Musk's Tesla stock awards, Lipton said, shareholders benefited from the stock award cancelations by being dramatically less diluted in their holdings.  "That the attorneys are asking for a little bit of dilution" through their fee, "but far less than the shareholders would otherwise have suffered, seems like a real benefit that was provided, from a financial point of view."

Lipton said she was not familiar enough with the current Tesla fee motion to comment on the percentage sought, but cited the enormous risk and stockholder counsel loss in SolarCity and said that "attorneys deserve to be compensated" when they prevail.

University of Michigan Law School professor Gabriel Rauterberg said the fee bid in Tesla appears excessive, despite the importance of fee as a motivator.  "It seems to me extremely implausible that an award this large is necessary to provide the right incentives, given that plaintiffs attorneys' fixed costs for investigating lawsuits, conducting research, and prosecuting cases can be significant but not on this scale," Rauterberg said.  "It seems like a windfall to me. You can give the attorneys a large award, while still falling short of billions."

Counsel for the Tesla stockholders have pointed out that Delaware's Supreme Court has in the past declined to replace the current fee approach with declining percentages.  "Under Delaware law, the unprecedented size of the benefit conferred does not alter plaintiff's counsel's entitlement to 33% of that benefit," attorneys for the Tesla stockholders wrote.  They also pointed to voluntary concessions reducing the total ask to around 11%, with features that reduce the cost to the company.

Some of the sting felt by Tesla, the brief indicated, could be taken away by federal tax law terms that will make 21% of the fee award cash tax-deductible, reducing the post-tax fee award cost from $5.63 billion to $4.45 billion.  State corporate income tax and payroll tax deductions and allowances also could offset the share payout.

UConn's Myers said the Tesla stockholder attorneys won a landmark victory and "deserve to be compensated handsomely" for taking a risky case through trial, while also predicting that the court will "take a hard look at the magnitude of the benefit actually achieved here — that may be a figure in some dispute."  The case nevertheless also stands as an example of "how the Delaware system effectively harnesses the efforts of folks like the plaintiffs attorneys to generate powerful incentives for good governance at public companies," Myers said.

A recent Law 360 story by Emlyn Cameron, “Plaintiffs in Kwok Trustee Case Must Pay Paul Hastings’ Fees”, reports that a New York magistrate judge said a group of U.S.-based Chinese nationals must compensate Paul Hastings LLP for more than $327,000 in legal fees the firm wracked up combating a case found to be part of a harassment campaign against billionaire exile Ho Wan Kwok's Chapter 11 trustee.  U.S. Magistrate Judge Jennifer E. Willis said Tao An and other Chinese nationals owed Paul Hastings and one of its former attorneys, Luc A. Despins, more than $326,000 in attorneys fees and more than $840 in costs for employing Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP.

An and the others brought an ill-fated suit alleging the firm was a foreign agent because it represented a bank controlled by the Chinese Communist Party, but U.S. District Judge Valerie Caproni dismissed the suit and sanctioned the plaintiffs in August.  "Having sought a fight, plaintiffs cannot now complain that they've been punched in the face," Judge Willis said in her order.

Judge Caproni determined the case was part of a harassment campaign aimed at Despins, who had been appointed Chapter 11 trustee in Kwok's bankruptcy.  Since An and the others brought the case, they have to bear the costs that Despins and Paul Hastings incurred pushing back, Judge Willis said.  An and the other plaintiffs had argued against the fees, saying they were excessive and not backed by reliable evidence of the time each attorney spent on the case.  But, that wasn't true, Judge Willis said.

The way that Despins and Paul Hastings submitted the hours worked for the various Davis Polk attorneys was difficult to parse but not impossible, and the court was able to work out what each was owed.  The hours those attorneys billed were reasonable and resulted in legal successes for the defendants, the order said.  The defendants had given the court evidence that showed Davis Polk was charging rates consistent with those charged by similar firms, Judge Willis said.

The plaintiffs had also argued that the fees were too large for them to pay, with Despins and Paul Hastings retorting that it seemed like they were being bankrolled by Kwok, a self-described billionaire, and so should not have trouble paying.  Judge Willis sided with the defendants, because An and the others hadn't given the court evidence that they couldn't pay, she said.

A recent Las Vegas Review-Journal story by Taylor Avery, “Uber-Backed Proposal Would Cap Attorney Fees at 20%”, reports that rideshare company Uber is backing a proposal in Nevada to cap the percentage of fees an attorney can collect in civil cases.  The “Nevadans for Fair Recovery Act,” an initiative petition filed with the Secretary of State’s Office by a group of the same name, aims to ensure plaintiffs receive “their fair share” of awards or settlements in civil cases by capping attorneys’ fees at 20 percent.

Uber lobbyist Harry Hartfield said in a statement that the petition would bring “common sense reforms” to the state’s legal system.  “A system where billboard and television attorneys can afford to spend more than $100 million a year on advertisements and lobbying, while plaintiffs are left with barely half of their judgments, doesn’t benefit anyone except a small number of attorneys,” Hartfield said.  “Our hope is that this ballot measure can bring common sense reforms to the legal system, put victims first and potentially lower costs for all Nevadans.”The Retail Association of Nevada and Nevada Trucking Association are also supporting the measure. 

Major Las Vegas personal injury firms Dimopoulos Law, Adam S. Kutner Injury Attorneys and Naqvi Injury Law weren’t available for comment late Monday afternoon, but trial lawyer organization Nevada Justice Association President Jason Mills said Uber’s purpose for filing the petition is “embarrassingly transparent.”

“It’s more of Uber protecting itself,” Mills said. “This could make it harder for everyday folks in Nevada to get competent representation.”  “We protect Nevadans that can’t protect themselves from corporations like [Uber],” he said.

Under the proposal, attorneys would not be able to collect a contingency fee, or a percentage of the amount awarded in a civil case, greater than 20 percent of the award.  The cap would apply to all forms of awards, including settlements, arbitration, and judgements.  Currently, there’s no cap on how much attorneys can collect in contingency fees, except in certain circumstances.

The cap would apply to the awarded amount after legal fees have been deducted from the total amount, meaning attorneys will still be reimbursed for actual legal costs, including those incurred by hiring expert witnesses or conducting investigations.

Instead of being paid on an hourly basis, some lawyers are instead paid by contingency fees, meaning the amount they’re paid depends on how much they recover for the plaintiff.  Contingency fees aren’t allowed in criminal cases, but are common in personal injury cases.  Proponents of contingency fees say they improve access for plaintiffs who couldn’t otherwise afford an attorney and give attorneys an incentive to win cases for plaintiffs.

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